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The concept of rule of law has been addressed as a formal or as a substantive notion. Although it 
does not enjoy a generally accepted academic definition and its practical transposition varies 
according to the implementing State, it is a founding value and a functional necessity for the 
European Union. However, the recent case law of the ECJ on this matter seems to narrow down 
the concept of rule of law to one of its elements, namely the independence of justice. This is due 
to the specific context in which the ECJ had to develop the standard, and which is linked to the 
rule of law backsliding noticed over the past few years in Hungary and Poland and, to some extent, 
in Romania. In the specific case of Romania, the ECJ displayed a moderate stance, possibly due 
to the fact that an institutionalised monitoring of the rule of law has been in place since 2007. 
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Rule of law is a broad interdisciplinary concept that can difficultly be encapsulated in 
a general or universally accepted academic definition. To start with, the very label of the 
concept varies according to the different languages that use it: rule of law, Etat de droit, 
Rechtsstaat etc.1. These various designations reflect different contents in various 
environments and according to different legal traditions. Then, the abstract concept of 
rule of law seems to lack the proper content and the logical consistency needed in order 
to acquire a scientific definition that would rely mainly on descriptive characteristics – 
that distinguish it from any other scientific concept already known – and not on 
exclusively prescriptive objectives set forth by the human intellect. Finally, in practise, 
the concept has migrated from one State to another, and, in the process, it has acquired 
new meanings2, although a common denominator can be inferred from all particular cases 
acknowledged worldwide.  
In recent years, the concept of the rule of law has become crucial for the legal system 
of the European Union (EU). While it has to be acknowledged that the rule of law has 
been an implicit core value of the EU ever since the creation of the community of States3, 
the concept has gradually developed into a principle opposable to the EU institutions and, 
finally, into a fully-fledged legal standard imposable by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) on Member States4. This evolution has been accelerated by what 
has been spelled out in 2013 by Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European 
Commission and Justice Commissioner as “rule of law crisis”5. In her speech she referred 
to «the Roma crisis in France in summer 2010; the Hungarian crisis that started at the end 
of 2011; and the Romanian rule of law crisis in the summer of 2012». Subsequent 
evolutions in other Member States have put the rule of law, and particularly the 
independence of justice, at the forefront of the legal and judicial debate within the EU6. 
They have also contributed to a fresh analysis of the EU scope of powers and to the 
development of an innovative approach by the ECJ of its competence to interpret and 
validate EU law. Since the reversal of democratic transitions or the backsliding of 
established democracies has often started with the systematic demolition of independent 
courts, it is the principle of the independence of justice that became the core of arduous 
judicial debates within the EU. Based on legal instruments developed by the Council of 
Europe and various institutions of the EU, particularly on articles 19 TEU and article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECJ declared the independence of justice to be 
                                                 
1 L. Heuschling, Etat de droit. Rechtsstaat. Rule of Law, Dalloz, Paris, 2002. 
2 E. Carpano, Etat de droit et Droits européens, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2005. 
3 According to the European Court of Justice «The Community is based on the Rule of Law, in as much as 
neither its Member States nor its Institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures 
adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty». See Case 294/83, Parti 
Ecologiste “Les Verts” v. Parliament. 
4 «The main sense of the RoL (rule of law – n.n.) thereby achieved at the layer of the European Union 
revolves around the value of legality including judicial review as a tool vis à vis non-compliance». See G. 
Palombella, The EU’s Sense of the Rule of Law and the Issue of its Oversight, EUI Working Paper Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Vol. 125, 2014, p. 2.  
5 V. Reding, The EU and the Rule of Law – What Next?, 4 September 2013, speech /13/677, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_677.  
6 L. Pech, S. Platon, Judicial Independence Under Threat: The Court of Justice to the Rescue, in Common 





Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/2021 ISSN 2612-6672 | DOI 10.13130/2612-6672/15826 | 105  
 
a vital element of the rule of law and underlined its importance as core value and legal 
principle defining EU integration as prescribed by article 2 TEU. 
In the specific case of Romania, the events of the summer of 2012 have been 
considered rather a “constitutional crisis”7 than a systemic backsliding of the rule of law. 
Given the fact that since its accession to the EU, i.e., since the 1st of January 2007, 
Romania – together with Bulgaria – is subject to a mechanism of cooperation and 
verification (MCV) meant to monitor the fulfilment of specific benchmarks in the areas 
of judicial reform and the fight against corruption, strict enforcement of the EU acquis in 
the particular area of justice and rule of law has been systematically supervised by the 
European Commission. Until 2017-2018 this has been considered sufficient to guarantee 
adherence to the fundamental values and principles of the EU. However, following the 
general elections of December 2016, a rather populist executive supported by a similar 
majority in Parliament triggered a swift attack on the independence of the judiciary 
through legislative amendments, institutional reforms and the weakening of the criminal 
or integrity legal framework. Regular reports issued in the framework of the MCV started 
to reflect the situation on the ground and to mention possible systemic threats to the rule 
of law and the independence of justice. Parliamentary elections of December 2020 have 
changed the political majority and managed to put in place an executive which placed 
high on its agenda the reversal of most judicial reforms undertaken during 2017-2018.  
Although the rule of law backsliding in Romania has been weaker and of a shorter 
duration than those observed in other EU Member States, Romanian courts capitalised on 
the experience gained by the ECJ with regard to the protection of the rule of law and 
started to address preliminary questions pertaining to the compliance of Romanian 
judicial reforms with EU acquis on judicial independence. At the cut-off date of this paper 
only one of these cases had been decided by the ECJ8, while opinions of the Advocate 
General are available in all of them. From all the above one can infer that the stance taken 
by the EU with regard to Romania may be alleviated by the fact that the MCV is still in 
place and the dimensions of the backsliding have been lesser than in other Member States, 
but significant deviations from what it has now become a fully-fledged EU acquis in the 
area of rule of law are and will continue to be sanctioned. 
 
2. Rule of law as an abstract concept  
 
Rule of law is an abstract notion. From an analytic point of view, the concept of rule 
of law has been addressed either as a purely formal notion, or as a formal and procedural 
one, or as a substantive and even teleological notion.  
Thus, in what has been labelled as a “thin” or legalistic conception of the rule of law, 
the notion has been defined as a set of formal values that compel the human conduct 
through the governance of rules9. Those rules are enacted by the State and they pertain to 
                                                 
7 B. Iancu, Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law in Romania. The Crisis in Concepts and Contexts, in 
A. von Bogdandy, P. Sonnevend (eds.), Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area. Theory, 
Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania, Hart/C.H. Beck, Oxford/Munich, 2015, pp. 153-170. 
8 On May 18th, 2021, the ECJ ruled in Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, 
Asociația “Forumul Judecătorilor din România”. A brief analysis of this decision is provided in the final 
section of this paper. 
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formal aspects that legitimate power – such as non-retroactivity, publicity, universality of 
reach or non-discrimination – making possible the compliance of human conduct with 
laws. Joseph Raz created a metaphor where the rule of law is viewed as a sort of 
“sharpener” of the law, enhancing its effectiveness10. By formally expressing power 
through laws which can be enforced either benevolently or by the State power, laws 
acquire the capacity to subject human behaviour in a more efficient way. However, 
according to this conception, the rule of law can be used as an instrument in order to better 
achieve political goals irrespective of the content or substance of those goals. And courts 
may find themselves in situations where the adage dura lex, sed lex becomes a mere tool 
for imposing power rather than containing or constraining it.  
This possible outcome has been perceived as a weakness of the formal theory on the 
rule of law and it has been addressed by other scholars11 via a formal and procedural 
approach of the concept. In this conception, the rule of law refers not only to formal 
constraints objectively imposed on power and which make it legitimate, but it also refers 
to procedural commitments which imply a subjective attitude of the human subject. 
Namely, human conduct is subjected to rules expressed in formal laws not only because 
those laws are formally enacted in a valid manner, but also because the human subject is 
committing her/himself to those laws and may adjust its conduct while being aware of 
laws and able to challenge them, including in front of neutral and impartial courts through 
a due process and abiding by formal procedures. Again, courts are an intrinsic element of 
the rule of law, a component that is able not only to increase the effectiveness of laws, 
but also to allow the human beings to legally challenge those laws. 
In what has been considered as a “thick” or substantive approach of the concept of rule 
of law, the notion has been defined as not merely a set of formal and/or procedural values, 
but also as an array of institutional arrangements stemming from normative 
commitments12, many of them associated with liberal democracy. Given the fact that even 
this substantive approach can be distorted or misused for ends which are discriminatory 
or otherwise unjust, some scholars13 have appended it with an additional nuance, 
including a teleological approach to the rule of law. In this conception, the rule of law is 
a functional notion, defined as a set of arrangements meant to temper power and not only 
to limit or enable it. However, by tempering power, the rule of law still contributes to 
enhancing its legitimacy, although such an outcome is relying on context. But by 
tempering power the rule of law creates the possibility for the human being to manifest 
itself in the context of power, thus allowing human conduct to become the main purpose 
of the rule of law. By acknowledging that, if treated superficially, the rule of law can be 
manipulated and transformed into its contrary, such substantive or teleological 
approaches require a genuine vision of the concept of the rule of law. At the same time, 
by accepting that even a substantive conception of the rule of law can be misinterpreted, 
the teleological approach accepts that it functionally remains dependent on specific social, 
                                                 
10 J. Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in J. Raz (ed.), The Authority of Law: Essays on law and morality, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 210-229. 
11 J. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1964; 
J. Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, Working paper no. 08-50, 2008, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273005.  
12 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, Allen Lane, London, 2010. 
13 M. Krygier, Tempering Power, in M. Adams, A. Meuwese, E. Hirsch Ballin (eds.), Constitutionalism 
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political, historical and/or legal and institutional contexts. As long as the rule of law is 
not internalised into acts and attitudes in everyday life there is still a danger that it may 
be present as a superficial form to be formally enforced by the State. The role of courts 
depends on this contextual and functional approach.  
To sum up, the concept of rule of law is an “essentially contestable concept”14, i.e., a 
concept with descriptive and prescriptive content over which there is a lack of widespread 
agreement. However, any attempt to describe rule of law or to identify its main elements 
or vital characteristics cannot ignore courts and their role for the protection of human 
rights. 
 
3. Rule of law and the independence of justice  
 
Rule of law is valued not only for formal, procedural, or substantive reasons embedded 
in the Constitution or for the institutional arrangements made in order to guarantee it. 
Rule of law is valued rather for its main outcome, namely that State power is less arbitrary 
and can even become less coercive and be more predictable and more impersonal. In other 
words, rule of law creates a mutual bond among human beings and between them and 
State power and it allows for the mitigation of the asymmetry that political power 
intrinsically involves making possible the free manifestation of the human being. The 
ultimate guarantor of this freedom of the human being is a judicial system able to defend 
«rights, liberties and legitimate interests». In order to perform this function, the judicial 
system needs judicial independence.  
It is worth noticing that the independence of justice represents a core pillar of the 
concept of rule of law, irrespective of the thin or thick approach taken with regard to the 
notion and regardless of the legal tradition in which the abstract concept is implemented 
and put into practice. 
In this context, the independence of justice means rather the independence of the 
judiciary and it represents a distinct idea from that of the separation of powers, which 
anyway refers to the division and blending of powers within a State. The independence 
of the judiciary raises issues such as the ability of the judicial system (courts and judges) 
to perform their activity free of influence or control by other actors, whether 
governmental or private. This means that the judiciary is no longer a tool meant to ensure 
that the division between the legislative and the executive is well functioning, but it 
represents an empowering instrument in the hands of the human beings who are able both 
to contribute and to challenge the legislative and the executive, thus contributing to 
legitimizing power. In other words, the judiciary has the important function of protecting 
human rights. Therefore, in all enumerations of the characteristic elements of the rule of 
law an independent justice, both as an institution (judicial system) and as an activity 
(functioning of the judiciary), remains of outmost importance and is dealt with separately 
from the issue of the independence of justice as one of the branches of the State power.  
Against this background it has to be mentioned that the independence of justice also 
includes the independence of judges, considered as individuals performing the function 
of justice within the judicial system. It encompasses their protection and insulation from 
                                                 
14 «The Rule of Law is a much celebrated, historical ideal, the precise meaning of which may be less clear 
today than ever before». See R.H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 
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any influences that may originate either inside the judicial system or outside it, that is 
from influences coming from the legislative or the executive. While judges and the 
judicial system are not and should not be insulated from society and while justice as an 
activity remains essentially a public service and the judiciary remain accountable 
ultimately to the human beings whose rights it has to defend, the protection of judges 
from influences or pressures coming from the political sphere is an integral part of the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
4. Rule of law in the European Union: from value to legal standard  
 
With this theoretical framework in mind, one has to notice that the transposition of the 
intellectual concepts into legal norms and everyday practice takes its own path. Various 
legal instruments at international and national level mention the rule of law as a defining 
value for the political entities they address, but the content of the rule of law thus referred 
to is not spelled out in those documents. The third paragraph of the Preamble of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 affirms that «it is essential, if man is not 
to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law». At national level, 
number of constitutions, particularly those adopted during democratic transitions, identify 
the rule of law as a fundamental characteristic of the State they govern and stop there, 
without further detailing the concept.  
In the European continent the standard of the rule of law has been developed in various 
instruments issued by the Council of Europe and particularly by the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). In fact, the Venice 
Commission was established in May 1990 as an advisory body to the Council of Europe 
on constitutional matters in order to help States to align with European standards «in the 
fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law». The most prominent tool 
developed by the Venice Commission to this date remains the Rule of Law Checklist15 
which is not an obligatory legal document, but rather a descriptive list attempting to 
identify «common features of the Rule of Law/Rechtsstaat/Etat de droit» and meant as 
an instrument allowing «to evaluate the state of the rule of law in single States». The case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights is also relevant for a complete overview of 
the European legal standard regarding the rule of law. 
As for the States which have created an integrated European community, the rule of 
law has been mentioned for the first time in a legal instrument concomitantly with the 
birth of the European Union. In 1992 the preamble of the Treaty of Maastricht referred to 
the confirmation by the Member States of «their attachment to the principles of liberty, 
democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of 
law», whereas the Treaty itself endowed the Court of Justice with «jurisdiction in actions 
brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this 
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers». Article 6 of 
                                                 
15 Rule of law checklist, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 
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the Treaty of Amsterdam16 provided rule of law constitutional ambit both at EU level and 
at the level of the Member States. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union17 makes the rule of law a core founding value of the European Union, 
while article 21 TEU18 declares it a guiding principle that has «inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement», which is why the EU is also considering the same values 
and legal standards for its external action and cooperation and development policies. 
Likewise, rule of law has been a condition for the accession of new members to the EU 
since the Copenhagen criteria established in 199319. 
The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) starts to mention the 
rule of law a bit later. Until the beginning of the years 2000 it was mainly the parties or 
Advocates General who invoked the rule of law20. The Court of Justice itself started to 
refer to the legal standard of the rule of law only in 2007 in Segi21 and Gestoras Pro 
Amnistía22. 
From all the above it can be safely inferred that rule of law represents a core value for 
the community of States joined in the European Union, as well as for each individual 
Member State, and a prerequisite for any enlargement process. This conclusion is 
supported by the gentle swap undertaken by the rule of law from the preambles of various 
EU founding treaties into their substantive matter, and further reinforced by the use of the 
concept in the case law of the ECJ by the Court itself, thus accomplishing an almost un-






                                                 
16 Article 6, para. 1, TEU then provided that «the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the rule of law, principles which are common 
to the Member States». 
17 Article 2 TEU: «The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail». 
18 Article 21 TEU: «The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider 
world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles 
of the United Nations Charter and international law». 
19 Detailing articles 6 and 49 TEU, which set out the conditions and principles imposed to any State aspiring 
to become an EU member, a number of standards known as “Copenhagen criteria” – because they have 
been established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 – are the filter imposed to all enlargement 
processes since 1993.  
20 S. Platon, Les fonctions du standard de l’État de droit en droit de l’Union européenne, in Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, Vol. 2 No. 55, 2019, p. 310.  
21 Case C-355/04 P, Segi and Others v. Council of the European Union. 
22 Case C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v. Council of the European Union. 
23 K. Lenaerts, New Horizons for the Rule of Law within the EU, in German Law Journal, Vol. 21 Special 
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5. Rule of law and democratic backsliding within the EU  
 
However, within the EU, the concept acquired a new function once the phenomenon 
of rule of law backsliding24 has been identified towards the beginning of the 2010s, based 
on developments noticed particularly in Hungary and Poland, but also, to some extent, in 
Romania especially after 201625. Most relevant were judicial reforms performed in those 
States, which have been perceived by EU institutions as seeking to reduce the 
independence of the respective national judicial systems and, in some cases, also to 
jeopardize the independent functioning of constitutional courts. It has to be mentioned 
that these are States that have joined the EU after 2004, in a context where article 4926 of 
the TEU creates a clear correlation between rule of law and accession conditionalities, 
which implies that full respect of the rule of law had to be established prior to their EU 
accession. 
Furthermore, for Bulgaria and Romania a special mechanism for cooperation and 
verification (CVM) has been developed in order to assess ex-post, meaning after their 
accession to the EU, their progress in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against 
corruption and, in addition in Bulgaria, against organized crime27. It is interesting to note 
that, among the explanations provided for the establishment of this original post-
accession arrangement, which – so far – has not been duplicated in subsequent 
enlargements, the first one refers to the fact that the «European Union is founded on the 
rule of law» and that implies «for all Member States the existence of an impartial, 
independent and effective judicial and administrative system properly equipped, inter 
alia, to fight corruption»28.  
Nevertheless, when confronted with a series of “rule of law crises” in several States 
that joined the supranational organisation after 2004, the EU could no longer merely refer 
to the rule of law as core value and founding principle and had to delve into its legal 
system and devise the rule of law as a mandatory legal standard in order to reflect its 
functional necessity for the Union.  
A precedent existed in the sense that democracy and rule of law had already been 
challenged even prior to 2004 in one EU Member State. The specific context created by 
the surprising and momentous results of the 1999 parliamentary elections in Austria 
brought to power a right-wing coalition government that included a controversial right-
                                                 
24 M. Blauberger, R.D. Kelemen, Can Courts Rescue National Democracy? Judicial Safeguards against 
Democratic Backsliding in the EU, in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 24 No. 3, 2017, pp. 321-
336; D. Kochenov, P. Bard, Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU – The Pitfalls of Over-
emphasizing Enforcement, Working Paper No. 1, July 2018, available at: https://reconnect-europe.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/RECONNECT-KochenovBard-WP_27072018b.pdf.  
25 E.S. Tănăsescu, Criminal Policy or Criminal Politics?, available at: https://iacl-aidc-
blog.org/2017/02/16/analysis-criminalpolicy-or-criminal-politics/. 
26 Article 49 TEU: «Any European State which respects the values referred to in article 2 and is committed 
to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national 
Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the 
Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of 
the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of 
eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account». 
27 See Decision (2006/928/EC) for Romania and Decision (2006/929/EC) for Bulgaria. 
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wing party. Article 729 of the TEU proved its limits rather quickly. Initially designed as a 
political mechanism meant to deal ex-post with such situations through the imposition of 
political sanctions, article 7 refers in a broad manner to breaches to all or any of the values 
stated in article 2 TEU and it remains a rather formal device. The experiment of 1999 
proved the need for the design of an ex-ante (preventive) mechanism for the same 
purpose, but this has been neglected over the following revisions of the EU treaties. The 
inadequacy of article 7 to a series of “rule of law crises” in some EU Member States, 
particularly in Eastern Europe, became noticeable upon hesitations and attempts to 
enforce it against Hungary and Poland during the 2010s30.  
Therefore, the EU developed a range of initiatives in order to address the issue of 
breaches to the rule of law both from a preventive and a corrective perspective31. In order 
to address what it has considered to be “systemic threats to the rule of law” the European 
Commission has launched in 2013 an EU Justice Scoreboard32 as «a tool to promote 
                                                 
29 Article 7 paragraphs 1-3 TEU provides: «1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, 
by the European Parliament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four 
fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a 
clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in article 2. Before making such 
a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to 
it, acting in accordance with the same procedure. The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on 
which such a determination was made continue to apply. 
2. The European Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a 
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in article 2, after inviting the 
Member State in question to submit its observations. 
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, 
may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member 
State in question, including the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State 
in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a 
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons. 
The obligations of the Member State in question under the Treaties shall in any case continue to be binding 
on that State». 
30 While EU institutions draw the political consequences of the 1999 experiment with article 7 TEU and 
Austria and preferred to act with significant self-restraint from then onwards, activating it rather late (2017), 
legal scholarship continued to vigorously support its enforcement with regard to Hungary and Poland. See 
e.g. D. Kochenov, L. Pech, Better Late Than Never?, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 24, 2016, 
p. 1062; L.F.M. Besselink, The Bite, the Bark and the Howl: Article 7 TEU and the Rule of Law Initiatives, 
in A. Jakab, D. Kochenov (eds.), The Enforcement of EU Law and Values, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2017, pp. 129-143; S. Carrera, P. Bard, The European Parliament Vote on Article 7 TEU against the 
Hungarian Government. Too Late, Too Little, Too Political?, CEPS, 14 September 2018, available at: 
www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/european-parliament-vote-article-7-teu-against-hungarian-government-
too-late-too-little/. 
31 Their effectiveness has already been questioned by the doctrine. See e.g. D. Kochenov, L. Pech, 
Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality, in European 
Constitutional Law Review, Vol. 11 No. 3, 2015, pp. 512-540; M. Waelbroeck, P. Oliver, La crise de l’Etat 
de droit dans l’Union européenne: que faire?, in Cahiers de droit européen, 2017, pp. 299-342; Hague 
Journal on the Rule of Law – Special Issue on the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Vol. 10 No. 1, April 2018; A. Di Gregorio (ed.), The Constitutional Systems of Central-Eastern, 
Baltic and Balkan Europe, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2019. 
32 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central 
Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The EU Justice 
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effective justice and growth» and in 2014 a Rule of Law Framework33 meant to set out 
«a new framework to ensure an effective and coherent protection of the rule of law in all 
Member States […] before the conditions for activating the mechanisms foreseen in 
article 7 TEU would be met». In an attempt to standardise the concept of rule of law, in 
2014 the Commission identified six principles which «define [...] the substance of the rule 
of law», namely the principle of legality, which essentially presupposes the existence of 
a transparent, responsible, democratic and pluralist legislative procedure; the principle of 
legal certainty; the prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive power; the independence 
and impartiality of the courts; the principle of effective judicial review, including respect 
for fundamental rights; and finally equality before the law. It then proceeded to implement 
them in an overall evaluation. As a result, a first annual report on the situation of the rule 
of law within the EU has been issued in 202034. Last in a long list of legal and institutional 
attempts to promote and protect the rule of law within the European Union is the recent 
linking of the EU budget to the respect of rule of law35, already challenged in front of 
Court of Justice by Hungary and Poland. All these initiatives have further contributed to 
the transformation of the rule of law from a value and a legal standard into a fully-fledged 
legal norm, including deterrent sanctions in case they would be necessary. In a nutshell, 
at the level of EU, the fortified enforcement of the rule of law became the antidote to 
democratic backsliding.  
Along with other EU institutions, the ECJ has also been involved in the transfiguration 
of the rule of law from a value into a legal norm and into a corrective to democratic decay. 
Be it through the infringement procedure or through preliminary questions, the ECJ 
spread-out its realm as to encompass the judicial protection of rule of law with regard to 
EU institutions36 and with regard to Member States37. However, it is interesting to note 
that the relevant case-law of the ECJ does not refer to the legal standard of the rule of law 
in a comprehensive manner, nor does it take the previous approach that equated rule of 
law with legality, certainty, predictability, i.e. with the emphasis upon «a community of 
people and States based on the rule of law»38 as it used to be the case until the democratic 
backslide knocked in. As of recently, the case law of the ECJ with regard to the rule of 
law in the context of democratic decay narrows down the concept to one of its elements. 
For the time being, it is essentially the principle of the independence of justice, under its 
various forms and shapes, which has been mobilized by the ECJ. This focus stems from 
the context of the relevant case law: it is essentially this aspect of the rule of law that is 
                                                 
33 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law (COM/2014/0158 final). 
34 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 2020 Rule of Law Report. The rule of 
law situation in the European Union (COM/2020/580 final). 
35 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget. 
36 See e.g., Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Parliament and Council; Case C-72/15, 
PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty’s Treasury and Others.  
37 See e.g., Case C 286/12, Commission v. Hungary; Case C-619/18 R, Commission v. Poland; Case C-
192/18, Commission v. Poland; Joined Cases C-83/19, 127/19 C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19 Asociaţia 
“Forumul Judecătorilor din România”. 





Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/2021 ISSN 2612-6672 | DOI 10.13130/2612-6672/15826 | 113  
 
currently at issue in Hungary and Poland and that has concentrated a lot of attention in 
Romania as well, mainly between 2017 and 2019.  
 
6. Why the independence of justice matters 
 
Judicial independence is important not only because it is considered a shield against 
external and internal influences, be they political, social, ideological, financial etc., but 
also because it is considered a guarantee of the impartiality of justice with a view to the 
greater and general scope of justice, namely fidelity to law and not to State power or 
human will. Since the independence of justice stems from the constitutional traditions of 
EU Member States as one of the core values of any democratic system of government, 
until the “systemic threats to the rule of law” it was assumed that inside the EU breaches 
to this foundational principle are not conceivable. Moreover, adjusting the independence 
of the judicial system to fit a certain political context or to achieve a specific (individual 
or subjective) goal means tampering not only with the judicial independence, but also 
with the rule of law. Such approaches were deemed implausible within the EU. 
However, the reversal of democratic transitions or the backsliding of established 
democracies has often started with the systematic and deliberate demolition of 
independent institutions, among which courts rank first. Indeed, recent alterations of the 
classical concept of rule of law have questioned the principle of the independence of 
justice and the very role assigned to courts in constitutional democracies39. Courts are 
supposed to constrain power in order to limit its potential for arbitrary and enable it to 
manifest itself in legitimate ways. In a State governed by the rule of law the judiciary 
should protect the separation of powers as enshrined by the fundamental law. That means 
that courts have to make sure that nor the legislative neither the executive can assume and 
monopolize popular sovereignty and that both powers have to respect fundamental rights. 
Therefore, it is a common expectation that courts would be able to act in ways which 
allow for the survival of the rule of law and prevent the exercise of power from derailing 
into various harmful transfigurations. If the legislative or the executive manage to impose 
their views on the judiciary, the impact of courts on democracy is void of meaning and 
the confidence of citizens in the role, importance and independence of justice is in danger. 
Although it has been argued that «opposing popular regimes in the long run is not an 
option»40 and courts cannot ignore popular beliefs, courts cannot afford to ignore or 
disrespect law even more than public opinion41. The power of the judiciary relies as much 
in the rationality of the legal arguments which support judicial decisions as in the people’s 
consent to obey the law and that is something which stems from the substantive concept 
of the rule of law. Therefore, attacks on the independence of the judiciary are a serious 
threat to the rule of law. The Hungarian and Polish cases being rather well-known by 
                                                 
39 L. Pech, K.L. Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, in Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, Vol. 19, 2017, pp. 3-47. 
40 J. González-Jácome, In Defense of Judicial Populism: Lessons from Colombia, in International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, 03-05-2017, available at: www.iconnectblog.com/2017/05/in-defense-of-judicial-
populism-lessons-from-colombia/2017.  
41 E.S. Tănăsescu, Can Constitutional Courts Become Populist?, in M. Belov (ed.), The Role of Courts in 
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7. Rule of law and independence of justice in Romania 
 
7.1. Independence of justice – Romanian legal framework  
 
According to the Constitution (article 124), in Romania justice shall be rendered in the 
name of the law and justice shall be one, impartial, and equal for all. Judges shall be 
independent and subject only to the law. Article 126 of the Constitution provides that 
justice shall be administered by the High Court of Cassation and Justice, and the other 
courts of law set up by the law, while the jurisdiction of courts and the procedure shall be 
stipulated only by law. The Romanian judiciary is regulated through two laws, law no. 
304/2004 dealing with judicial organization and law no. 303/2004 dealing with the statute 
of magistrates. Judicial proceedings are regulated by the civil procedural code and the 
criminal procedural code. Separately, law no. 317/2004 regulates the Romanian judicial 
council (Superior Council of Magistracy – CSM), a corporatist autonomous body in 
charge with the management of human resources and disciplinary procedures against 
magistrates (judges and prosecutors). These three laws have replaced previous ones 
adopted early in the democratic transition of Romania (1992) and have been revised 
significantly rather soon after their coming into force, in 2005, and then again in 2018. 
The Constitution only mentions the independence of judges and not judicial 
independence. However, article 1 of the Constitution declares Romania «a democratic 
and social State, governed by the rule of law, in which human dignity, the citizens’ rights 
and freedoms, the free development of human personality, justice and political pluralism 
represent supreme values, in the spirit of the democratic traditions of the Romanian 
people and the ideals of the Revolution of December 1989, and shall be guaranteed». It 
also provides that «the State shall be organized based on the principle of the separation 
and balance of powers – legislative, executive, and judicial – within the framework of 
constitutional democracy». And article 21 of the Constitution guarantees free access to 
justice, unrestricted by any law, to all persons in the defence of their «rights, liberties and 
legitimate interests», while all parties are «entitled to a fair trial and a solution of their 
cases within a reasonable term». 
 
7.2. Independence of justice – Romanian legal and institutional reforms 
 
All prerequisites for the respect of rule of law and judicial independence seem to be in 
place. And, for what it’s worth, Romanian judicial reforms initiated in 2017 by a populist 
majority in Parliament and its supporting Government have not gone as far as those in 
Hungary or Poland. Nevertheless, the rule of law backsliding which manifested shortly 
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general assault on the independence of the judiciary through legislative amendments42, 
institutional reforms43 and the weakening of the criminal or integrity legal framework. In 
a nutshell, judicial reforms in Romania focused, inter alia, on the creation of a special 
prosecutorial section meant to investigate crimes accomplished by magistrates coupled 
with the diminishing of powers of the prosecutorial section dealing with the fight against 
corruption, the personal liability of magistrates for judicial errors as well as the 
patrimonial liability of the State for miscarriages of justice. Also, the legal procedures for 
the appointment of the chief prosecutor of the newly created special section meant to 
investigate crimes accomplished by magistrates have been revised by Government 
immediately after their approval by Parliament in order to make possible the designation 
of a specific person. Civil society, an important fraction of the magistrates, parliamentary 
opposition and the President of Romania used all available instruments in order to stop 
or limit the damages. Challenging judicial reforms in front of the Constitutional Court, 
the use of presidential veto, requests for opinions from Venice Commission or GRECO, 
requests of preliminary rulings by national judges asking the ECJ to clarify the 
compliance of different national reforms with EU law or pressure made by EU and other 
regional and international bodies represented complex resilient practices. I have detailed 
the political and constitutional context of that general assault elsewhere44. Following the 
general elections of December 2020, a different parliamentary majority has set forth to 
reverse the tide and correct – to the extent where this is still possible – the wrongs already 
done, so far with mitigated success. 
Still, in 2019 Romanian courts have addressed number of preliminary questions45 to 
the ECJ concerning the respect of rule of law and judicial independence. Until the cut-off 
date of this contribution the Advocate General has presented his opinion in most of the 
cases concerning the independence of justice in Romania. Although some of these cases 
are still pending, one has been decided by the ECJ on the 18th of May 2021. While the 
details of each case may be of interest for a seasoned lawyer, this paper will not delve 
into their specifics, but rather attempt to summarize the main issues at stake.  
 
7.3. Independence of justice – preliminary questions of Romanian courts 
 
In short, preliminary questions coming from Romania face the ECJ with two broad 
types of queries. The first one has to do with the primacy of EU law, an old but still 
interesting subject. In essence, Romanian judges want to know whether EU law takes 
precedence over national law not only with regard to the judiciary, but also as far as the 
legislative and the executive are concerned when they design and implement national 
policies. And in particular, Romanian judges needed guidance on the nature, legal value 
and effects of the MCV mechanism and of the periodic reports adopted on its basis, 
                                                 
42 B. Selejan-Gutan, Failing to Struggle or Struggling to Fail? On the New Judiciary Legislation Changes 
in Romania, in VerfBlog, 31-01-2018, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/failing-to-struggle-or-
struggling-to-fail-on-the-new-judiciary-legislation-changes-in-romania/. 
43 B. Selejan-Gutan, New Challenges against the Judiciary in Romania, in VerfBlog, 22-02-2019, available 
at: https://verfassungsblog.de/new-challenges-against-the-judiciary-in-romania/  
44 E.S. Tănăsescu, Romania: From Constitutional Democracy to Constitutional Decay?, in V. Besirevic 
(ed.), New Politics of Decisionism, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2019, pp. 177-191. 
45 See in particular cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19, C-379/19, C-397/2019, C-
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especially in the light of a recent case law of the Romanian Constitutional Court. The 
second question relates to some institutional innovations brought by the recent judicial 
reforms and validated by the Constitutional Court, particularly to the creation of a special 
prosecutorial section for the investigation of magistrates, as well as to the composition of 
courts’ panels specialised in the fight against corruption. 
The first question is not new in itself, but it allows the ECJ to go beyond its classical 
case law on issues of validity and interpretation of EU law. Also, its novelty stems from 
the fact that is has been framed from a perspective that is specific only to Bulgaria and 
Romania, since they are the only two Member States enjoying a post EU accession 
mechanism of cooperation and verification (MCV) regarding the rule of law. The second 
question is not new either, since the ECJ has already dealt with similar issues, within the 
context of rule of law, be it in relation with judicial reforms undertaken in Hungary or 
Poland or with regard to the legal status of prosecutors in other Member States. The first 
answers of the ECJ to the preliminary questions addressed by Romanian courts are 
expected during the first half of 2021 and, without going into prospective law, it seems 
reasonable to expect similar responses to those already provided to other national courts 
in comparable situations. 
Thus, from the onset, it has to be mentioned that national institutional arrangements 
within the judicial systems of Member States are a substantive matter where competences 
have not been explicitly conferred upon the EU. However, even when Member States 
exercise their residual competence, they should make certain that their actions do not 
impede the fulfilment of EU’s tasks. In practical terms, this means not only that Member 
States cannot disregard EU values, but also that they should assist the EU in fulfilling its 
own competences. Therefore, while in accordance with article 4 TEU the Union has to 
respect the «fundamental structures, political and constitutional» as well as «their 
essential State functions», it cannot allow disrespect to core values and foundational 
principles of article 2 TEU. The more so since the EU system of competences is complex, 
flexible, teleological, and evolving. In the absence of competence in matters of judicial 
organisation, the EU action in this area may be based on competence in terms of 
guaranteeing the rule of law46. Therefore, while the principle of conferral governs the 
limits to EU competences and judicial organisation remains firmly within the remit of 
Member States, the independence of justice within Member States may have relevance 
for the EU from several perspectives: the necessary uniform interpretation and application 
of EU law if it is meant to remain a normative system with precedence over national legal 
systems, the principle of effective judicial protection of rights bestowed upon European 
citizens by the EU law, the principle of mutual confidence of courts and, last but not least, 
the possibility of courts to address preliminary questions to the ECJ without any 
interference. All these arguments are to be found in the seminal case C-64/16, Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, where the ECJ took the precaution to specify that «in 
the fields covered by EU law» EU law protects the independence of national courts. 
Therefore, the ECJ ruled that Member States have to make sure that national courts «meet 
the requirements essential to effective judicial protection» of which the principle of 
judicial independence is an integral part. The argument being of general nature, there are 
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no reasons to believe it will not be continued by the ECJ, including in the answers that 
will be provided to Romanian courts. 
 
7.3.1. Primacy of EU and the specifics of the Mechanism of Cooperation and 
Verification instituted by Decision 2006/928/EC 
 
With regard to the first issue, iteratively raised in a first batch of preliminary 
questions47 addressed by Romanian courts to the ECJ, which relates to the primacy of EU 
law, the concern was not so much the binding value of the Commission’s Decision 
2006/928/EC 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of 
judicial reform and the fight against corruption but rather the nature and legal effects of 
the MCV mechanism as such, and particularly of the periodic reports adopted on its basis. 
The ECJ has been specifically asked whether the recommendations contained in the 
Commission’s yearly reports are binding on Romanian authorities.  
In his opinion, delivered in September 2020, the Advocate General Michal Bobek 
made clear that, while Decision 2006/928/EC and the mechanism of cooperation and 
verification is compulsory for Romanian authorities, the reports and the recommendations 
therein do not enjoy binding value although «they are to be duly taken into consideration 
by that Member State». Thus, according to article 4 of the Decision 2006/928/EC, the 
addressees of such reports are the concerned Member States and therefore the 
consequences of non-compliance, «beyond the possibilities to declare and sanction a 
potential infringement through the ordinary means of EU law, may also lead to important 
effects on the participation of Romania in the internal market and on the area of freedom, 
security and justice». However, since the periodic reports issued by the Commission are 
meant for the attention of the Council and of the European Parliament, they do not enjoy 
the same status as the Decision 2006/928/EC and the mechanism set forth by it. Therefore, 
in the opinion of the Advocate General, national judges cannot rely on the 
recommendations contained in MCV reports in order to set aside the application of 
provisions of national legislation that they deem contrary to such recommendations.  
The decision of the ECJ on this specific question was awaited with great interest 
particularly against the case law of the Romanian Constitutional Court which, in decisions 
no. 104/2018 and no. 682/2018, ruled that «since the meaning of Decision 2006/928/EC 
establishing a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism has not been clarified by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union as regards its content, character and temporal 
limit and whether all these are circumscribed to the provisions of the Treaty of accession 
[...], that Decision cannot be considered as a reference norm for the judicial review». As 
a result, the Romanian Constitutional Court refused to make any further reference to 
Decision 2006/928/EC and considered that the legislator is within its margin of 
appreciation, as provided by the “constitutional identity” corroborated with national 
sovereignty, whenever it is making laws that regulate the substance matter of topics 
covered by the MCV.  
Such a position seems difficult to be upheld in the future, at least as far as the legal 
nature and binding value of the Decision 2006/928/EC and the MCV are concerned, 
                                                 
47 See Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19, C-291/19, C-355/19 and C-397/19, Asociația “Forumul 
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particularly in the light of the recent ECJ decision Asociația “Forumul Judecătorilor din 
România”, delivered on the 18th of May 2021 and which clearly asserts the binding nature 
of those EU legal instruments and their direct effect. Nevertheless, the Romanian 
Constitutional Court may lawfully continue to refuse to refer to these EU legal 
instruments as norms of reference for the constitutionality review it performs, although if 
it decided to turn to a substantive approach towards the concept of the rule of law it would 
have to acknowledge the correlation between article 1 para. 348 of the Romanian 
Constitution, which states that Romania is a State governed by the rule of law, and the 
substantive matter of Decision 2006/928/EC.  
On the other hand, ordinary courts of Romania, which are also ordinary courts 
implementing EU law, find themselves in a totally different situation. Indeed, in a 
masterpiece decision, the ECJ has managed not to follow the relativity displayed by the 
Advocate General with regard to the recommendations formulated in the regular reports 
of the Commission in the framework of the MCV and, while underlining the guiding 
value of regular reports and recommendations for legislative, executive and judicial 
authorities of Romania to establish the mandatory character of both Decision 
2006/928/EC and MCV, as well as of the benchmarks they provide49. The ECJ also 
obliged regular courts to ensure the full effect of all above mentioned legal instruments, 
including by leaving, if necessary, unapplied, on their own authority, any contrary 
provision of national law, even subsequent, without having to request or await the prior 
elimination of it by legislative means or by any other constitutional process.  
Thus, while avoiding to enter in a blunt conversation with the Romanian Constitutional 
Court, the ECJ simply made use of its classical teleological method of interpretation and, 
in paragraph 249 of its decision Asociația “Forumul Judecătorilor din România”, 
established that «as regards Decision 2006/928/EC, which is more precisely referred to 
by the considerations of the Constitutional Court […], that decision imposes on Romania 
to achieve as soon as possible the benchmarks it sets out. As long as these objectives are 
formulated in clear and precise terms and are not subject to any conditions, they have 
direct effect». The ECJ has managed to reach two objectives with only one strike: it 
clarified the nature and legal effects of the original legal instrument which is the MVC, 
and it made binding and enjoined direct effect to the benchmarks fixed by the MCV. By 
the same token, based on its usual teleological approach, the ECJ has put forward a 
substantive approach of the rule of law, thus also creating a potential mandatory character 
                                                 
48 Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Romanian Constitution provides: «(3) Romania is a democratic and social 
State, governed by the rule of law, in which human dignity, the citizens’ rights and freedoms, the free 
development of human personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values, in the spirit of 
the democratic traditions of the Romanian people and the ideals of the Revolution of December 1989, and 
shall be guaranteed». 
49 Para. 178 of the ECJ decision Asociația “Forumul Judecătorilor din România”: «Decision 2006/928 
falls, as regards its legal nature, its content and its effects over time, within the scope of the Accession 
Treaty. This decision is, as long as it has not been repealed, binding in all its elements for Romania. The 
benchmarks set out in its annex aim to ensure that this Member State respects the value of the rule of law 
set out in article 2 TEU and are binding on that Member State, in the sense that the latter is required to take 
the appropriate measures to achieve these objectives, taking due account, under the principle of sincere 
cooperation set out in article 4 (3) TEU, of the reports drawn up by the Commission on the basis for the 
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for the recommendations made by the European Commission in its regular reports50. And 
without overtly confronting the Romanian Constitutional Court and its in statu nascendi 
doctrine on “constitutional identity”, the ECJ has de facto succeeded to considerably 
reduce the margin of appreciation of Romanian authorities and oblige them to comply 
with the substance matter of the MCV. From now on, benchmarks of the MCV are to be 
considered as EU acquis, irrespective of the various positions that may be held internally 
by national authorities.  
 
7.3.2. Judicial organisation and disciplinary regime of magistrates 
 
The second broad question raised by Romanian courts concerns judicial reforms 
pertaining to judicial organisation. Among other issues, all relevant for judicial 
independence, the most sensitive ones touch upon the creation of a special disciplinary 
regime for magistrates51 and the composition of panels of courts dealing with the fight 
against corruption52. While the disciplinary regime of magistrates has been seriously 
altered by the judicial reform of 201853, the composition of courts’ panels specialised in 
the fight against corruption is the result of a re-evaluation made by the Romanian 
Constitutional Court, particularly in decisions no. 685/201854 and no. 417/2019, of the 
status quo resulting from a series of previous reforms. 
  
7.3.2.1. Disciplinary regime of magistrates 
 
Unfortunately, the disciplinary regime of magistrates is becoming a regular feature in 
front of the ECJ55. The opinion of the Advocate General Michal Bobek brings no news in 
this area when it states that while EU law does not impose a specific model of judicial 
organisation or disciplinary regimes, the independence of justice means that the national 
legislation «must provide the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of that 
disciplinary regime being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial 
decisions». Going into the details of each case, the Advocate General explained why the 
                                                 
50 With regard to the legal effects of the reports drawn up by the Commission on the basis of Decision 
2006/928, the second paragraph of the operative part of the ECJ’s decision Asociația “Forumul 
Judecătorilor din România” specifies that they formulate demands with regard to Romania and address 
“recommendations” to that Member State with a view to achieve the benchmarks. «In accordance with the 
principle of sincere cooperation, Romania must take due account of the said requirements and 
recommendations» and must refrain from adopting or maintaining measures in the areas covered by the 
benchmarks which could compromise the outcome of the requirements and recommendations prescribed. 
51 Cases C-379/19, C-397/2019, C-811/19, C-840/19. 
52 Cases C-357/19, C-547/19, C-379/19, C-811/19, C-840/19. 
53 B. Selejan-Gutan, New Challenges against the Judiciary in Romania, in VerfBlog, 22-02-2019, available 
at: https://verfassungsblog.de/new-challenges-against-the-judiciary-in-romania/. 
54 See E.S. Tănăsescu, Romania – Another Brick in the Wall Fencing the Fight against Corruption, in 
VerfBlog, 19-03-2019, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/romania-another-brick-in-the-wall-fencing-
the-fight-against-corruption/. 
55 See Advocate General’s Opinion in Cases C-487/19 W.Ż. (Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public 
Affairs of the Supreme Court – Appointment) and C-508/19 Prokurator Generalny (Disciplinary Chamber 
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interim appointment of Romanian Chief Judicial Inspector and the establishment of a 
specific prosecution section with exclusive competence for offences committed by judges 
and prosecutors are contrary to EU law. This follows the line already set in cases 
concerning judicial reforms undertaken in Poland and it may be fair to expect similar 
decisions with regard to Romania. Needless to say, the Romanian Constitutional Court 
had previously validated all these reforms, albeit from the perspective of the national 
Constitution and not from the perspective of their compliance with EU law. 
Here as well the ECJ has taken a nuanced and slightly different view than the Advocate 
General. In the third paragraph of the operative part of its decision Asociația “Forumul 
Judecătorilor din România” the ECJ ruled that «the legal framework governing the 
organization of justice in Romania, such as the one relating to the ad interim appointment 
to managerial posts of the Judicial Inspectorate and the establishment of a section of the 
public prosecution responsible for investigating crimes committed against within the 
judicial system, fall within the scope of Decision 2006/928, so that they must comply 
with the requirements arising from Union law and, in particular, from the value of the 
rule of law set out in article 2 TEU». But while the ad interim appointment of the chief 
inspector of magistrates was found to be in breach of EU law (fourth paragraph of the 
operative part of the same decision), the creation of a special prosecutorial section for the 
investigation of magistrates was left for the examination of national courts. In particular 
national courts are required to examine whether such an institutional novelty is justified 
by objective and verifiable requirements drawn from the good administration of justice 
and whether it is accompanied by guarantees against its utilisation as an instrument of 
political control, able to undermine their independence or to prevent them from fulfilling 
their competence as agents of EU law enforcement (fifth paragraph of the operative part 
of the same decision). 
By placing the legal framework regarding the organization of justice in Romania under 
the scope of Decision 2006/928 and not acknowledging it as an area where the EU only 
has residual competences, as it had explicitly done previously, in Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses, the ECJ has emphasized once more the specificity of the MCV, its 
legally binding effects and the limits of the margin of appreciation that Romanian 
authorities enjoy when legislating in the substantive matter covered by Decision 
2006/928. Building upon its own case law pertaining to appointments in the judicial 
systems of Member States and the disciplinary regime of magistrates56 the ECJ found that 
an ad interim appointment of the chief inspector of magistrates which appears to have 
been “custom made” could contradict relevant EU acquis but made its judgement 
dependent on the specific national context (para. 205-206). However, the creation of a 
special prosecutorial section for the investigation of magistrates could also represent an 
additional guarantee for the independence of magistrates provided it did not «allow 
complaints to be introduced in an abusive manner, inter alia for the purpose of interfering 
in sensitive ongoing cases, including complex and high-profile cases related to high-level 
corruption or organized crime» (para. 218). Since the ECJ noted that «practical examples 
drawn from the activities of the SIIJ are such as to confirm the realization of the risk […] 
that this section is akin to an instrument of political pressure» (para. 219) it summoned 
                                                 
56 See judgements in cases C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality; C-619/18, Commission v. 
Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court); C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (Independence of ordinary 
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national courts to consider that its creation is a breach to EU law unless it is justified by 
an objective raison d’être which it will serve exclusively.  
As for the personal liability of judges for damages caused by a miscarriage of justice, 
the ECJ concurred with the Constitutional Court that it can only be compatible with EU 
law in so far as it is limited to exceptional cases and framed by objective and verifiable 
criteria taking into account requirements drawn from the sound administration of justice 
as well as guarantees aimed at avoiding any risk of external pressure on the content of 
judicial decisions.  
However, on the patrimonial liability of the State for damages caused by a miscarriage 
of justice, while the ECJ adopted an identical stance with the one pertaining to the 
personal liability of judges (i.e., it has to be limited to exceptional cases and framed by 
objective criteria drawn from a sound administration of justice), the Romanian 
Constitutional Court has recently ruled differently. In a decision taken in March 2021 but 
expected to be published after the cut-off date of this contribution, the Constitutional 
Court decided that the State is liable not only in cases of miscarriage of justice, but also 
in case pre-trial custody has been imposed during criminal proceedings that ended-up 
through an acquittal, a cessation or a dismissal for any other cause of the criminal 
prosecution, thus expanding the scope of State liability beyond mere miscarriages of 
justice57. It has to be acknowledged that on the topic of the patrimonial liability of the 
State a judicial dialogue between the ECJ and the Romanian Constitutional Court was not 
possible due to the timing of their respective decisions.  
 
7.3.2.2. Composition of courts specialised in the fight against corruption  
 
As for the composition of courts’ panels specialised in the fight against corruption, an 
issue which has been raised only in Romania, the Advocate General found, in April 2021, 
that, in principle, the EU law does not prevent a national constitutional court from 
observing that judicial panels have not been established lawfully. Nevertheless, if the case 
involves the financial interests of the EU, the situation should be examined carefully and, 
in case the requirement is merely formal, fulfilling such a requirement would be 
superfluous and it would represent a breach of EU law, particularly of article 325 (1) 
TFEU. In fact, the Advocate General went a step further and noted that the ECJ should 
find that a particular ruling of the Romanian Constitutional Court (no. 417/2019) does 
violate EU law (article 325, para. 1, TFEU). Analysing the substantive matter of that 
decision of the Romanian Constitutional Court he considered it to be unlawful insofar as 
the composition of the panels would be declared unlawful only due to the formal lack of 
specialization of those judges in corruption cases while the same judges were 
acknowledged to be specialised in criminal law. Together with the fact that, as a result of 
that decision, numerous first-instance corruption cases dealt with between April 2003 and 
January 2019 would have to be reviewed and retried, the practical consequences of such 
a decision based on thin formal grounds appeared problematic because of the effects 
brought upon the financial interests of the EU. A decision of the ECJ on this matter is still 
awaited.  
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8. Conclusion  
 
Rule of law and independence of justice are core values of the EU and have an 
important position on the agenda of EU institutions. In recent years the ECJ had to take 
an active stance in the definition of these legal standards. It is a fact that the recent case 
law of the ECJ on this subject has been concentrated on judicial independence, most 
probably because such have been the cases and questions brought in front of it by the 
Commission and/or the Member States. However, the independence of justice is only one 
of the elements of the rule of law. It remains to be seen whether the diffusion of the rule 
of law across the EU and Member States will be followed by its thickening, i.e., whether 
the relevant ECJ case law will include other constitutive elements and foundational 
principles of the rule of law than judicial independence. For the time being, the ECJ has 
made clear that ensuring respect for the rule of law within the EU legal order is not 
exclusively a judicial task and that it equally concerns EU institutions and Member States, 
and within these last ones the legislative and the executive as well as the judiciary. Such 
rulings of the ECJ are to be expected in all areas where the EU has even limited powers. 
This brings the ECJ closer to the substantive approach of the concept of rule of law, while 
allowing it to continue to refer to article 2 TEU. Therefore, in order to respond to this 
requirement and fully transpose the EU acquis on the rule of law, Member States cannot 
simply attempt to fix some of their national “rules” but need to revise the entire rationale 
of their legal systems and rebalance them as to get attuned to the substantive meaning of 
this multifaceted concept. It follows that formalistic adjustments of the legal framework 
pertaining to the organisation and functioning of national judicial systems may not be 
enough and an entire new legal culture has to be implemented by all national authorities.  
Nevertheless, in areas that are not governed by the EU law, the challenge to the rule 
of law remains wide open and entirely within the remit of concerned Member States. In 
the case of Romania (and Bulgaria) the unprecedented rule of law monitoring mechanism 
has long been considered a safeguard against rule of law backsliding, until it has been 
challenged. Therefore, it has been even more puzzling to observe how backsliding can 
happen, albeit in a contracted manner, even where safeguards and monitoring are in place. 
This has been done while concerned national authorities were voicing queries about the 
long-term effectiveness of MCV, questioning its very continuation since its initial, 
technical and narrow, objectives had been since long achieved. Indeed, number of regular 
reports issued by the European Commission before 2017 started to mention the term 
“irreversible reforms”, the main target for both the Commission and Romania on the 
subject matters that were submitted to this special monitoring. In addition, the uniqueness 
of the MCV allowed the concerned States to express doubts with regard to the possibility 
that breaches to the rule of law or independence of justice in other Member States might 
get out of sight simply because of the lack of an adequate monitoring tool. In that sense, 
the first annual report on the situation of the rule of law within the EU, which for Bulgaria 
and Romania has replaced the MCV reports for 2020, has been a useful exercise in order 
to have a transversal image of the rule of law across all EU Member States. Nevertheless, 
in order to reach the full lift of the MCV clear safeguards need to be put in place, as the 
short-lived but intense assault on the rule of law of 2017-2019 has revealed.  
From all the above one can infer that the stance taken by the EU with regard to 
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as by the reality that the dimensions of the backsliding have been lesser than in other 
Member States, but significant deviations from what it has now become a fully-fledged 
EU acquis in the area of rule of law are and will continue to be sanctioned, including via 
the case law of the ECJ. 
